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Abstract
According to the Lisbon Treaty, the common commercial policy is one of the exclusive policy competences 
of the European Union with reference to the member states. In recent years, several international agree-
ments have been negotiated. Among them, there are the EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade 
Agreement (CETA) and the Transatlantic Trade and investment Partnership (TTIP) with the United States. 
The EU is also discussing an agreement with the Latin American Mercosur states. A common feature of these 
treaties is the presence of a ‘labour chapter’ dealing with the recognition and enforcement of work-related 
rights. In the literature, studies suggesting that such provisions can encourage improvements are confronted 
by contributions arguing that trade openness can lead to a downgrading of working and welfare standards, 
with a lack of political will to rights enforcement. In addition, social clauses may vary depending on their 
subject. The article examines the three agreements under the viewpoint of labour and industrial relations 
conditions. Since these international treaties are supposed to play a regulatory function, their potential 
influence should be considered in times of intense globalisation.
Secondo il Trattato di Lisbona, la politica commerciale comune è una delle competenze politiche esclu-
sive dell’Unione Europea rispetto agli stati membri. Negli ultimi anni sono stati negoziati numerosi 
accordi internazionali, tra i quali il CETA (Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement) con il Canada 
e il TTIP (Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership) con gli Stati Uniti. L’UE è inoltre in trattative 
con i paesi latino-americani del Mercosur. Una caratteristica comune di questi trattati è la presenza di 
‘capitoli sociali’ riguardanti il riconoscimento e l’applicazione di diritti legati al lavoro. Nella lettera-
tura,	agli	studi	che	confermano	la	possibile	efficacia	di	tali	misure	si	contrappongono	i	contributi	che	
vedono	nell’intensificazione	dei	rapporti	commerciali	il	rischio	di	un	ridimensionamento	della	qualità	
del lavoro e del welfare, con una scarsa volontà politica di tutela. Inoltre, il contenuto delle clausole 
sociali	può	variare	significativamente.	Il	saggio	analizza	i	tre	accordi	in	base	alle	loro	disposizioni	in	
materia di lavoro e relazioni industriali. Poiché simili intese dovrebbero assumere una funzione rego-
lativa,	la	loro	possibile	influenza	è	da	valutarsi	nell’ambito	degli	attuali	processi	di	globalizzazione.
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Introduction
The recent trade agreement between the European Union and Japan (2018) has once 
more drew attention to the connection between terms of trade and social clauses. The 
treaty established a system of exchanges and consultations, with the involvement 
of the International Labour Organization (ILO) and of civil society organizations. 
Sustainable	 development	 is	 affirmed,	 with	 the	 protection	 of	 environment	 and	 the	
safeguard of EU norms also in social and labour matters (applying the precautionary 
principle) and with respect to the basic ILO conventions. The target of sustainable 
development is pursued by EU law through all relevant EU policies, including trade. In 
accordance with Art. 9 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU, 
2007), also called ‘the social clause’, the EU must promote a high level of employment, 
guarantee	adequate	social	protection	and	fight	against	social	exclusion	when	defin-
ing	and	implementing	all	EU	policies	(Rasnača	and	Theodoropoulou	2017).	Economic,	
social and environmental elements have to be interlinked in order to ensure social 
justice, respect for human rights and high labour and environmental standards. This 
entails the application of related international standards and agreements. Labour 
standards and principles are subject to the ILO, founded in 1919 after the Treaty of 
Versailles,	which	has	 been	 setting	 international	 rules	 through	 specific	 conventions,	
adopted at the annual conferences of its member countries. The 1998 ILO Declaration 
on	Fundamental	Principles	and	Rights	at	Work	and	 its	Follow-Up	 required	member	
states to respect and promote four core labour standards (freedom of association and 
collective bargaining, elimination of forced labour, elimination of child labour, elimi-
nation	of	discrimination	in	respect	of	employment	and	occupation),	affirmed	in	eight	
conventions. Though ILO conventions have legal status and must be enforced only 
after	ratification,	core	labour	standards	listed	in	the	1998	declaration	are	compulsory	
also	without	ratification	(Bakvis	and	McCoy	2008;	Bolle	2016).	Two	years	later,	the	ILO	
adopted	the	Decent	Work	Agenda	(2000),	which	supports	the	implementation	of	four	
strategic targets:
a) creating jobs;
b) guaranteeing rights at work;
c) extending social protection;
d) promoting social dialogue.
The	Decent	Work	Agenda	 has	 then	 been	 carried	 on	 through	 various	 country	 pro-
grammes and has been adopted by the United Nations’ Economic and Social 
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Committee and by the European Union, which pursues the promotion of decent 
work also in its trade agreements. ILO objectives have also often been enclosed in 
charters	and	codes	of	good	practice	developed	by	private	firms	and	multinationals,	
which usually also follow the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and the 
United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights. After the NAFTA Treaty be-
tween the US, Canada and Mexico (1994), several trade agreements have included so-
cial chapters or labour clauses. In particular, EU treaties have to contain a section on 
labour and sustainable development. Since the Lisbon Treaty (in force since 2009), 
the EU’s external policies must point at ‘fostering sustainable economic, social and 
environmental development of developing countries, with the primary aim of eradi-
cating poverty’ and must respect the principles ‘of democracy, the rule of law, the 
universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect 
for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity… and the principles of 
the United Nations Charter and international law’.1 Though in different forms, trea-
ties usually include procedures for settling disputes and commitments in order not 
to undermine the core labour standards to push competitiveness (Siroën 2008). The 
‘horizontal social clause’ of the Lisbon Treaty stipulates that EU policies must take 
social requirements into account to ensure consistency between policies and social 
objectives (Perulli 2014). Due to the stagnation of international action through mul-
tilateral channels, there is an increasing resort to diverse forms of lawmaking, in-
cluding governance through trade. This is mainly pursued by international actors 
with a strong normative international agenda (Marx et al. 2015). It is also a reaction 
to the limitations of multilateral agreements, since the lack of international enforce-
ment mechanisms causes a poor implementation of standards. The EU exerts power 
through trade using its market access power to promote its laws, standards, values 
and norms, and facilitates changes in terms of good governance, human rights and 
environmental policy in the context of its trade partners.
The paper intends to show that there are favourable conditions in order to let the 
EU play a stronger role in setting labour and social standards through trade agree-
ments. Some key examples (the TTIP, the CETA and the EU-Mercosur agreement) are 
illustrated as cases of possible improvements in social standards. In comparison to the 
past, the EU is currently more legitimated to undertake a standard-setting task, also 
beyond the limitations of the ILO.
1 Art. 21 of the Treaty on the European Union (2007).
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A review of theory: approaches and choices
According to De Ville and Siles-Brügge (2016: 132), the most frequently used approach 
to understand global trade politics relates to the public choice school of political sci-
ence. It is applied to explain opposite interests and rent-seeking behaviour by the ac-
tors. Linked to it is also the contribution by Olson (1965) on the logic of collective 
action, which is due to shed light on the political mobilization of economic groups, in-
duced by selective incentives able to determine organizational cohesion. Considering 
international trade agreements, the Common Commercial Policy is an exclusive com-
petence of the EU (Gstöhl and Hanf 2014). Following Art 21 of the TEU, this policy 
has clearly a wider scope than the abolition of restrictions on trade and investments. 
Political conditionality has been typical of EU trade policy since the 1990s. Using dia-
logue and incentives to implement labour and social standards imply a strong resort to 
exchange of information and reporting. The possible linkage between EU external trade 
and labour standards started to develop at the end of the 1970s, when the Economic 
and Social Committee made reference to a social clause in its opinions (Orbie, Vos 
and	Taverniers	2005).	In	1978,	a	social	clause	first	appeared	in	external	trade	relations	
by the initiative of the DG Development of the European Commission, particularly 
because of the relationship between foreign aid and labour standards. However, the 
matter was not discussed by the Council and, during the 1980s, only the European 
Parliament kept demanding the introduction of a social clause and insisted on the 
ratification	of	ILO	conventions	by	member	states.	In	the	early	1990s	the	question	re-
surfaced during the negotiations within the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT,	due	 to	become	the	World	Trade	Organization,	WTO)	when	 the	Council	 cau-
tiously supported the European Commission’s stance in favour of a social clause, then 
incorporated in the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP). At the same time, the 
EC	proposed	a	joint	ILO/WTO	Working	Group	to	discuss	the	social	issue.	But	later,	it	
supported a ‘soft governance’ style, stressing the role of the ILO as the internationally 
recognised organization dealing with labour standards and highlighting the corporate 
social	responsibility	of	firms.	After	the	Lisbon	Treaty,	trade	policy	has	officially	been	
defined	as	an	EU	competence.	Consequently,	member	states	–	through	the	Council	–	
are now less competent in comparison with the Commission, opposite to the situation 
before 2009.
Labour provisions can be distinguished between promotional (based on supervision 
and capacity building, plus social dialogue and monitoring) and conditional (based on 
either sanctions or incentives) (Ebert and Posthuma 2011). In case of disputes, friendly 
resolutions are generally preferred, and settlement provisions include several stages of 
reviews and consultation. EU agreements are usually promotional, but have progres-
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sively	enlarged	their	scope	and	normative	content.	Sanctions	can	influence	a	state’s	
behaviour quite effectively, and change its reputation among trading partners. But 
political reasons (degree of democracy, relevance of trading relations, governmental 
political orientation) can play an important role in the decision of imposing sanctions. 
Their effects on workers are also uncertain. In some cases they apparently worked 
(Ebert and Posthuma 2011: 24), but technical capacities for problem-solving and the 
scrutiny by social partners’ organizations are crucial. Cooperation through workshops 
and research activities has proved very useful, though it should be more focused, un-
der	careful	financial	assessment	and	with	 the	 support	of	 social	partners,	NGOs	and	
civil society organizations. The EU approach is centred on technical assistance and 
cooperation to improve labour rights as part of a broader sustainable development and 
human rights-related view of trade (Bakvis and McCoy 2008: 4). According to Perulli 
(2015), the Lisbon Treaty set the linkage between international trade and the promo-
tion of core labour standards, being a strategic step from free trade to fair trade. In EU 
agreements, parties usually undertake to keep their levels of protection and enforce 
their labour and environmental legislation. Bilateral committees are established for 
sustainable development issues (Bartels 2012).
According to the ILO (2015), about 40% of trade agreements including labour pro-
visions	have	a	conditional	dimension,	with	consequent	sanctions	or	benefits.	The	re-
maining 60% have a promotional nature and include provisions on dialogue, coopera-
tion, and/or monitoring. These are typical of the EU, but are equally binding and may 
entail a comprehensive institutional framework. Agreements can have positive effects 
with	adequate	economic,	employment	and	social	policies.	Pre-ratification	condition-
ality	 can	determine	major	 changes	 in	 labour	 law,	while	–	after	 ratification	–	condi-
tionality can improve compliance of existing norms (through complaint and dispute 
settlement procedures). The promotional approach often leads to the constitution of 
advisory groups with the social partners and civil society organizations. An expert 
panel may analyse disputes and issue recommendations. In order to increase the ef-
fectiveness of labour provisions, economic incentives seem to be more successful than 
sanctions. 
The three treaties under consideration
 a) The TTIP
The importance of the TTIP, whose negotiations started in 2013, is not only related 
to its mere contents. In a multilateral world, trade agreements are necessary in order 
to set common standards in whole regional areas. It is clearly a matter of trading goods 
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and	services,	but	also	of	defining	rules	and	principles	for	pacific	relationships	(Baldwin	
2014). This view can be set in the framework of international political economy, which 
is particularly suited to study interactions between economic and political factors, and 
of	globalization	studies,	since	the	increase	in	trade	flows	begun	in	the	early	1970s	is	
considered as an important dimension of internationalization (Milner and Keohane 
1996: 10). Keohane and Nye (2003) have also observed that, in times of globalization, 
accountability in the sphere of international organizations’ governance is strictly 
output-related,	with	legitimacy	depending	on	efficacy.	According	to	the	Sustainability	
Impact Assessment prepared for the TTIP (Ecorys 2017), the treaty is envisaged to 
promote the ILO standards and benchmarks. However, the assessment was required 
because civil society representatives argued that the treaty might entail a downgrad-
ing	of	labour	standards,	due	to	the	missing	ratification	of	most	basic	ILO	conventions	
by the United States.2	On	the	contrary,	EU	member	states	have	ratified	all	of	them,	and	
certainly the level of labour protection is higher than the minimum set in the conven-
tions. Nevertheless, according to the above-mentioned study, enforcement can still 
improve even in the EU. Following the negotiated texts, environmental and working 
conditions must be ensured in the framework of multilateral environmental agree-
ments and of basic ILO conventions. Sustainable development and corporate social 
responsibility must be respected, especially regarding the trade of natural resourc-
es. The treaty also establishes the participation of civil society in the control of the 
system	and	a	mechanism	of	dispute	resolution,	possibly	a	flexible	mediation	system.	
Concerning	work,	a	clear	reference	is	made	to	the	Decent	Work	Agenda	of	the	ILO	and	
to the respect of core labour standards, with the support of joint actions. Each party 
(the EU and the US) should keep its right to regulate, consistently with internationally 
recognised standards and agreements, with high levels of protection and improvement 
of domestic labour policies, preventing a race to the bottom to attract trade or invest-
ments. Before the current suspension of negotiations, the Commission proposed an 
Investment Court System (similar to that enshrined in the CETA), in order to replace 
the much contested Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) clause for investment 
protection	with	a	first	instance	tribunal	and	an	appeal	court.	While	judges	would	be	
appointed by the parties to the agreement, the appeal court would work on similar 
principles	to	those	of	 the	WTO	Appellate	Body,	which	has	remarkable	discretionary	
powers. Rules concerning the ability of investors to take a case before the tribunal, 
and	the	governments’	rights	to	regulate,	would	also	be	fixed	in	the	TTIP.	Perulli	(2015)	
remarks that the TTIP should provide the establishment of an expert committee – in-
cluding an ILO representative – to prepare regular reports, evaluate complaints and 
2 However, most of their content is covered by US law.
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recommendations and run periodical meetings for information exchange and discus-
sion. The EU and the US could devise a bilateral control body and formulate a social 
conditionality clause, with a dispute settlement procedure, since the Open Method 
of	Coordination	–	with	peer	review	and	benchmarking	–	may	not	suffice	as	a	form	of	
institutional cooperation.
 b) The CETA
Usually, Canada has adopted a similar approach to that of the US in its trade agree-
ments,	with	a	dispute	settlement	mechanism	and	the	possibility	of	inflicting	sanctions	
(Agustí-Panareda	et	al.	2014).	Like	the	US	(whose	trade	agreements	were	the	first	to	
refer to ILO instruments), Canada has inserted references to ILO conventions in its 
treaties, implying their implementation through domestic law and practices.
The CETA (signed in 2014), which is provisionally operative while waiting for the 
ratification	of	all	EU	member	states,	has	been	greeted	favourably	by	trade	unions	for	
its Investment Court System in place of an ISDS mechanism, which should introduce 
ethical	and	conflict	of	interest	standards	for	tribunals,	plus	the	possibility	for	them	to	
dismiss	claims	without	legal	merit.	It	is	a	permanent	court	of	fifteen	judges	appointed	
by the EU and Canada, whose auditions will be open to the public. The treaty includes 
commitments	 to	 ILO	core	 standards	 and	 fundamental	 conventions,	 and	affirms	 the	
implementation	of	multilateral	environmental	agreements.	It	also	confirms	the	right	
of each party to regulate in the areas of labour and environment as considered ap-
propriate or necessary, and stresses that labour and environmental rules must not be 
used to encourage unfair trade and investment practices (as disguised protectionism 
or by downgrading standards). Interestingly, the treaty sets up an institutional mecha-
nism to check its implementation and the application of enforcement procedures. It 
includes	a	specific	governmental	body	and	channels	for	the	domestic	and	bilateral	in-
volvement of civil society; a detailed process to address disputes, with governmental 
consultations and review by an independent panel of experts; a high degree of trans-
parency and an open review clause, according to which both parties check the effec-
tiveness of implementation and reconsider enforcement procedures.
Generally, agreements made by Canada are conditional and have evolved from the 
implementation of national law to compliance with minimum international stand-
ards (Ebert and Posthuma 2011: 11).3	They	include	fines	for	non-compliance,	whose	
amount	goes	to	a	fund	for	the	implementation	of	labour	rights	and	deficit	resolution.	
They also include technical assistance and dialogue through a ministerial council for 
3 In Canada, most labour law is provincial (Greven 2005).
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each	treaty,	with	national	officers	for	each	country.	Chapter	23	of	the	CETA	deals	with	
labour standards. NGOs must be involved in its implementation. There must be co-
operation with the ILO and other competent international or regional organizations. 
Each	party	has	to	designate	an	office	which	must	serve	as	contact	point	with	the	other	
party for the implementation of the chapter, including cooperation programmes and 
information. A Committee on Trade and Sustainable Development will oversee im-
plementation and review it. Each party will also have advisory groups for issues re-
lated to the chapter, which will gather representatives from civil society organizations, 
trade unions and employers’ associations. These groups will submit opinions and make 
recommendations. The chapter insists on the exchange of information between the 
parties. For unsolved matters, on request by a party a panel of three experts can be 
convened, chosen from a list of independent experts in labour law by the Committee 
on Trade and Sustainable Development. Its reports must be made public and require 
a follow-up.
 c) The EU-Mercosur Agreement
The	first	round	of	negotiations	of	the	EU	Association	Agreement	with	the	Mercosur	
countries (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay) was held in 2010, but talks about 
a potential agreement had already started in the 1990s. Currently, the chapters under 
discussion on agriculture and trade according to sustainable development include ref-
erences to labour and environmental aspects. Concerning the protection of the natural 
environment	 (forests,	fisheries,	biological	diversity	and	wildlife),	 the	chapters	 recall	
the Agenda 21 (1992), the ILO Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair Globalisation 
(2008), and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (2015). Both the EU and the 
Mercosur are committed to implementing the Paris Agreement on Climate Change 
(2015). The treaty should also include provisions on the involvement of civil society in 
its implementation. A clear reference to labour rights is made in the chapter on trade 
and	sustainable	development.	Art.	2	states	that	each	party	will	define	its	law	and	poli-
cies according to the above-mentioned international standards. The parties are also 
committed to improving environmental and labour protection levels, which is impor-
tant since implementation is often very problematic in cases of agreements between 
parties of very different administrative capacities. An interesting part of this article 
regards the commitment to respect environmental and labour provisions, even when 
ignoring them may encourage trade or investments. Art. 3 insists on the promotion of 
international trade in line with decent work, also for women and young people. The 
ILO Constitution and documents on fundamental principles and rights at work, plus 
the	ratification	of	the	basic	ILO	conventions,	are	considered	necessary.	The	exchange	
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of	information	concerning	ratification	and	resolution	of	trade-related	labour	issues	of	
mutual interest is also included. Possible violations are not allowed as either compara-
tive	trade	advantage	or	protectionism	forms.	With	a	precise	focus	on	implementation	
aspects, Art. 3 also remarks that each party shall develop and put into practice meas-
ures for occupational safety and health, decent working conditions (wages, working 
hours) and labour inspection.
The emphasis on the enforcement of labour regulations leads to the relationship 
between formal and informal employment. Studies on labour inspection have shown 
that labour regulations increase the costs of formal labour, but better compliance 
with	mandated	benefits	stimulates	formal	employment	(Almeida	and	Carneiro	2012).4 
Often, labour inspectors in developing countries are few and with scarce resources. 
Consequently, they hardly target informal employment, and rather concentrate on of-
ficially	registered	firms.	So,	formal	declarations	in	the	agreements	are	important,	but	
the real problem lies in actual implementation. Improvements in regulation are pos-
sible, but the effect of a trade agreement on law enforcement is uncertain, also under 
the point of view of the political will (Dewan and Ronconi 2018). These authors stress 
that,	with	reference	to	Latin	American	countries,	the	first	example	of	labour	provisions	
in free trade agreements signed by the US was the NAALC (North American Agreement 
on Labor Cooperation), a side agreement on labour and environment accompanying 
the NAFTA, which mainly committed signatories to enforce their own labour law.5 It 
made no reference to international labour standards, but subsequent trade agreements 
have referred to the ILO 1998 Declaration (including the four fundamental conditions 
previously mentioned) which has become the international basic reference for labour 
standards. In 1998, Mercosur countries have adopted a common declaration on labour 
conditions which goes beyond the core labour standards, and establishes a commission 
which oversees and advises member countries on compliance (Bakvis and McCoy 2008: 
4). According to Dewan and Ronconi (2018: 50), signing a free trade agreement with 
the US seems to improve the enforcement of labour law in Latin American countries, 
both through more control resources and a rise in inspection activities. It also helps in 
case multinational companies insist with the governments on the establishment of a 
common	competitive	playing	field	based	on	the	standards	agreed	in	the	treaties.	There	
could also be a stronger political and legal pressure to enhance enforcement, depend-
ing markedly on the letter of the agreements. Receiving funds from the US for capacity 
4 This study is on Brazil.
5 The NAALC had several problems related to dispute resolution, lengthy procedures, scarce 
resources and shortcomings in law enforcement (LaSala 2001). However, it recognised the laws on child 
labour, minimum wage and occupational safety and health as binding (Compa 2015).
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building has also proved effective. It remains to be seen whether the EU will also be an 
effective	partner	under	this	profile.	More	generally,	enforcement	can	be	difficult	when	
firms	are	not	correctly	 informed	by	governmental	 representatives.	Woll	and	Artigas	
(2007) report that, particularly in developing countries, state personnel may not be 
adequately prepared for negotiations. Consequently, employers have to rely on their 
own	networks	or	on	 international	organizations	 (e.g.	 the	WTO).6 It has to be added 
that clauses similar to those included in the Mercosur agreement are also present in 
the Association Agreement between the EU and Central American countries and in the 
EU Agreement with Andean countries (Colombia, Peru and Ecuador). It is a remarkable 
difference in comparison with the 1990s EU trade agreements with Chile, Argentina 
and Mexico, where labour rights were absent or rather included in a generic ‘human 
rights’ clause (Compa 2015). However, rather than on sanctions for possible violations, 
recent agreements resort to consultation, dialogue, cooperation, education and train-
ing,	joint	projects	and	information.	While	treaties	signed	by	the	US	often	include	sanc-
tions in case of violations, the EU still prefers ‘soft’ measures.
Discussion: enhancing the EU role in the definition and 
implementation of labour standards
According to Compa (1998), wide disparities between parties to an agreement often de-
termine a race to the bottom and frequent abuses to the damage of the weakest partner 
and	to	the	advantage	of	profit-minded	investors.	On	the	contrary,	when	the	partners	
have comparable and well-functioning social protection systems, labour laws and legal 
devices for enforcement, a strong social dimension in their treaties is a good starting 
point to encourage better policies, better management strategies and higher labour 
standards. In particular, European labour law and practice generally comply with core 
labour standards of the ILO. Freedom of association and collective bargaining are also 
protected by the European Convention of Human Rights and the European Charter on 
the	Fundamental	Rights	of	Workers	(the	Maastricht	Social	Protocol).	The	TTIP	could	
then encourage a stronger global respect of labour rights and standards, sending a 
clear message at international level. In addition, the US and the EU should harmonise 
their preferential trade provisions for developing countries exports, in order to dis-
courage labour abuses and monitor the implementation of social clauses. For sure, the 
impact	assessment	of	trade	agreements	with	reference	to	labour	standards	is	difficult,	
though apparently positive incentives work better than negative ones (Siroën 2008). 
6 The authors explicitly refer to cases reported during the Mercosur agreement negotiations.
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The North-South division persists inasmuch Northern (and more developed) countries 
have easier chances of compliance with decent work standards (and of being accused 
of protectionism), while Southern countries tendentially demand preferential treat-
ment or exceptions for vital economic sectors, being equally accused of protectionism.
An important issue is represented by the potential role of EU law. Some crucial 
subjects (the right to strike, collective bargaining, freedom of association) are excluded 
from EU law-making and reserved to state sovereignty because they strongly depend 
on national history and legal frameworks. EU Directives have been mostly focused on 
safety and health at work, non-discrimination, workers’ consultation, pensions and 
social security contributions. According to Compa (1998), these subjects are mostly 
uncontroversial, and this has somehow lowered the potential international impact of 
EU law. But, in the EU system, even single citizens – in addition to organizations – 
can complain to the European Commission (or, more simply, to a national judge) for 
the	implementation	deficit	of	a	directive.	National	governments	are	held	responsible,	
and the case may arrive at the European Court of Justice. Instead, in the ILO system, 
complaint procedures are not open to individual workers or NGOs, but rather to trade 
unions, employers’ organizations and governments. The latter can allege ILO conven-
tions’	violations	by	another	government	only	if	both	countries	have	ratified	the	con-
ventions in point. The UN can be another potential forum where labour rights’ viola-
tions can be either denounced by governments or by NGOs. Especially in the case of 
the UN and the OECD, public opinion pressure can also lead to a sanction. Generally, 
sanctions	can	involve	the	suspension	or	removal	of	beneficiary	status	in	the	GSP	sys-
tem. They may also go from ‘moral suasion’ attempts to investigations, self-reporting 
requirements, reviews by other governments, NGOs or international bodies, consulta-
tions,	recommendations,	labelling	requirements	and	fines.	Within	the	ILO,	all	member	
countries	must	report	annually	on	their	progress	towards	ratification	of	conventions,	
and	can	be	investigated	by	specific	committees.	The	lack	of	coercive	power	by	the	ILO	
to compel correction or to issue sanctions leads to public ‘shaming’ as the main form 
of	punishment.	On	the	contrary,	in	the	EU	system	monetary	fines	can	be	issued	against	
non-compliant governments, in case they do not respect rulings by the European 
Court of Justice. Moreover, member states may be ordered to pay monetary damages to 
citizens if the Court states that they suffered a violation of their rights deriving from 
the lacking implementation of a directive. Consequently, EU trade agreements should 
incorporate some elements of the internal judiciary system in order to overcome the 
missing enforcement powers of the ILO and the UN. An example could be the exten-
sion of EU complaint procedures to the citizens of the EU treaties’ signatory counter-
parts. As observed by Dombois et al. (2003), trade agreements often preserve national 
sovereignty, and this is connected to the dimension of political and economic domi-
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nance,	which	affects	agenda-setting	and	mutual	influence.	For	intergovernmental	log-
ics,	governments	also	prefer	to	avoid	conflicts	after	signing	agreements,	and	it	may	be	
difficult	to	identify	clear	effects	of	complaints,	also	because	treaties	are	often	seen	as	
supplementary to other routes, basically legal proceedings at national level (ibid.: 15). 
This consideration should reinforce the EU position in trying to consolidate compli-
ance mechanism modelled on its legal system, both in the relationships with develop-
ing	countries	(which	have	their	specific	implementation	problems)	and	with	developed	
ones (like the US). More space should also be opened to civil society organizations, as a 
form of public scrutiny on the implementation of treaties. This could become easier by 
establishing more effective modes of communication and monitoring between govern-
ments, and through more incisive incentives (similar to EU funds), with an automatic 
combination of mutual and symmetric obligations (ibid.: 21). Again, the EU concept of 
‘conditionality’ comes to the fore, and it looks very adequate also as a way to impose 
regulatory controls on globalising processes (Pedersini 2017; Hyde-Price 2006). As 
indicated by Rodrik (1997), globalization generates wage inequalities, normative and 
social	conflicts	and	an	increasing	demand	for	social	protection	against	work	instabil-
ity, with serious consequences especially in less developed countries, unable to prac-
tise redistributive policies. This furthermore encourages a stronger regulatory role by 
the EU at international level. Actually, where labour rights are protected, productivity 
levels and economic activity tendentially rise, due to the improvement of human capi-
tal and the increase in foreign investments (Onida 2009; Sengenberger 2002). Bolle 
(2016)	has	also	stressed	the	need	for	more	uniform	norms	on	penalties,	definitions	of	
labour provisions and dispute settlement. Moreover, instead of concentrating on the 
costs of labour standards’ adoption, stronger attention should be devoted to the eco-
nomic, political and social dividends of their implementation. This certainly requires 
financial	efforts	and	the	strengthening	of	the	whole	system	of	labour	administration	
at country level, but political stability and better economic conditions are extremely 
important results (Doumbia-Henry and Gravel 2006). In this sense, the international 
protection of workers could result weakened because of the interpretation and ap-
plication of standards according to the different trade agreements. Synergies among 
them would be advisable. It is also important to check whether reference is made to the 
ILO conventions or to the 1998 Declaration, and to see how labour provisions are for-
mulated in the agreements (Agustí-Panareda et al. 2014: 14). A more active role of the 
EU in promoting decent work has been suggested also by the European Commission, 
on the basis of its long-time experience with the European Social Model (European 
Commission 2006). Even more, it has been argued that, in the TTIP case, it would be 
necessary to go beyond ILO goals and add further protections, not yet included in the 
ILO/UN/OECD regimes (Faioli 2015).
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Conclusions
According to Alston (2005), the 1998 ILO Declaration gave an important signal in or-
der to establish stronger global labour law standards. However, free trade agreements 
still contain only the basic enforcement commitment related to domestic labour law, 
not	necessarily	reflecting	international	conventions.	Though	governments	may	not	be	
seriously engaged in reforming or redressing abuses, the ILO could be more active in 
terms	of	assessment	and	control,	also	of	multinationals,	 international	and	financial	
agencies	and	private	actors	–	and	would	need	further	financial	resources	(Alston	2005:	
477; Onida 2009). Analysing the impact of conventions and insisting on the normative 
content should help to understand whether substantive rights are respected. The ILO 
should also interact more constantly with other international institutional actors (like 
the	EU)	to	check	how	its	principles	can	influence	their	activities.	The	strengthening	of	
ILO control activities would be important also because of the lingering negotiations 
within	the	WTO,	which	have	hindered	multilateral	arrangements	so	far,	also	due	to	the	
refusal	of	the	same	WTO	to	deal	with	labour	and	environmental	issues	(in	the	lack	of	a	
general consensus on competition or FDI rules) (Tajoli 2017).
The recent agreement (2018) between the EU and the US on the lowering of tariffs 
and trade barriers does not anticipate anything about the future of the TTIP and of 
its	social	clauses.	But	the	EU	has	been	defined	a	‘civilian’	or	‘normative’	power	in	the	
debate on its international role, which could also justify a stronger consideration of its 
normative system. The ‘external governance’ approach has shown that, at least secto-
rally, the EU may be successful in promoting the adoption of its rules by third countries 
(Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 2009). The OECD (1996) has shown that there is at least 
a weak positive association between the degree of enforcement of labour rights and 
the level of economic development, and that there is no evidence that low-standard 
countries enjoy a better global export performance than high-standard countries. On 
the contrary, the respect of core standards could strengthen the long-term economic 
performance of all countries (ibid.: 13).
According	to	Bartels	(2012),	the	EU	human	rights	clause	is	robust	and	flexible	enough	
to be applied effectively. Moreover, ILO core labour standards are also human rights, 
and are therefore covered by the usual human rights clauses (European Commission 
2001). In the latter communication, the European Commission recognised that ‘global 
market governance has developed more quickly than global social	governance’.	While	
the	ILO	enforcement	mechanism,	limited	to	ratified	conventions,	has	also	lacking	ef-
fectiveness,	 the	WTO	 is	 stronger	and	 relatively	more	effective,	 relying	on	 its	 rules-
based system and a binding settlement mechanism (European Commission 2001: 3). 
The ILO instruments, including the supervisory mechanism (regular reporting and 
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complaint procedure) and the follow-up procedure to the 1998 Declaration (report-
ing plus technical assistance), are not incisive enough.7 Looking at the EU framework, 
labour standards are respected as a basic component of the European Social Model, 
and they also constitute a remarkable part of EU-level legislation, going from general 
rules on health and safety to working conditions, equal opportunities and non-dis-
crimination.	Norm-setting	in	these	fields	has	been	pursued	since	the	beginning	of	the	
European	Community.	In	the	more	specific	case	of	international	core	labour	standards,	
all	 the	EU	countries	respect	 the	fundamental	principles	and	rights	 identified	by	the	
ILO. Beyond proposing a strengthening of the ILO supervisory and complaint proce-
dures, the Commission also supports the resort to positive incentives – e.g. related to 
technical assistance – and a system of voluntary reciprocal commitment by states to 
respect the core ILO standards, involving adequate measures (like public recognition 
of effective implementation). Capacity strengthening in relevant ministries would be 
important, in order to formulate and apply legislation, within a multilateral framework 
of cooperation. A valid incentive for action could be the fact that foreign direct invest-
ments are apparently more consistent in countries with strong labour rights, since 
greater social and political stability is seen positively (Kucera 2002).
If a ‘new law’, beyond the ILO system and the regional EU dimension, is needed 
for social clauses (Treu 2017), still the EU could offer a solid basis. EU law has gained 
international appreciation on issues like competition, data protection, environmen-
tal	 protection,	 financial	 services,	 agriculture	 and	 food	quality,	 regulation	of	 chemi-
cal substances (Young 2015). The EU has not materially ‘exported’ its rules because 
of the complexities of domestic regulatory politics, which can make EU law adoption 
not convenient (due to high harmonisation costs and veto players). So, the acceptance 
of equivalence or convergence on the basis of international standards have prevailed 
alternatively up to now. The substance of labour standards can have resource impli-
cations for the parties involved in an agreement if they imply new labour policies, 
institutional arrangements, monitoring structures and participation in dispute settle-
ment procedures. New governmental institutions could also be necessary (Bourgeois 
et al. 2007). Nevertheless, important parts of EU labour provisions could be submitted 
during negotiations, for a potential introduction in the treaties, as it has already been 
done in practice in the above-mentioned policy areas.
According to Banks (2011), in trade agreements incentives contingent on progress 
to improve compliance may work better. And devising effective labour-trade linkages 
is important to involve employers actively and inform them, since sanctions and incen-
tives	must	affect	both	governments	and	firms	(Polaski	2004).	In	any	case,	the	inclusion	
7 In	the	same	communication,	the	EC	recalled	its	proposal	for	an	ILO/WTO	Standing	Working	Forum.
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of labour rights provisions in bilateral or regional agreements can be a promising strat-
egy for improving compliance (Greven 2005). In the case of the EU, such agreements 
are focused on human rights, development issues, technical cooperation and political 
dialogue, rather than on enforceable measures. Labour relations are often considered 
as	mainly	internal	institutions,	and	external	pressure	may	not	be	sufficient	to	change	
rules and behaviours. Greven (2005) also warns that the negotiating phase of an agree-
ment does not eliminate ‘bargaining within/between states’, with consequences on 
the industrial relations systems deriving from such further pressures. Since the ILO’s 
approach has not provided a secure enforcement of conventions, the introduction of 
labour rights provisions in the EU trade agenda in the 1990s is an answer to remedy the 
missing	involvement	of	the	WTO	and	the	lacking	cooperation	between	it	and	the	ILO.
Since	the	EU	trade	policy	is	firmly	established	in	the	Treaty	on	the	European	Union,	
it is not an end in itself, but a powerful means to ‘higher ends’ (Larik 2015). This should 
encourage – if not a norm-exporting attitude – a more incisive strategy to enhance 
the	international	influence	of	EU	law	and	practice	on	the	setting	of	labour	and	social	
standards.
Note: Texts of the agreements and thematic reports are available on the Trade Policy website of the 
European Commission (http://www. ec.europa.eu/trade).
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